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ANTITRUST STANDING: LABOR IS GIVEN A NEW TEST IN
ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS
INTRODUCTION
The sparse legislative guidance 1 for interpreting section 4 of the Clayton
Act 2 has placed the burden of developing a framework for antitrust standing
analysis on the courts. The federal courts, searching for a consistent ap-
proach to determine whether a party allegedly injured by an antitrust viola-
tion has standing to sue,
3 have historically applied four tests: direct injury,
4
target area, 5 zone of interests, 6 and matrix of factors.7 Previously reluctant
to assess the utility of these tests, the Supreme Court in Associated General
Contractors of California, Inc. v. Californza State Council of Carpenters8 has finally
reconciled the various approaches by formulating its own version of a bal-
ancing test.
In Associated General Contractors, the Court articulated six factors which
controlled their balancing test. Three of the factors, intent of the violator,
risk of duplicative recovery, and directness of the injury, will provide a co-
gent framework for future antitrust standing determinations. The other
three factors, type of injury, difficulty of damage apportionment, and specu-
lativeness of the claim, however, do not appear to be satisfactory considera-
tions for a standing analysis.
Concluding that the alleged injury was not of a type protected by the
antitrust laws, the Court in Associated General Contractors denied a labor union
standing to sue for treble damages under section 4.9 The consequences of
the Associated General Contractors decision are significant for labor organiza-
tions in that their ability to bring antitrust actions against alleged antitrust
law violators has been substantially diminished.
This comment provides an overview of the legal background of private
antitrust standing'0 and an analysis of the Associated General Contractors case.
1. The legislative history of§ 4 is sparse and sheds little light on the question of standing.
See Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 811-12
(1977).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). The original version of§ 4 was enacted as § 7
of the Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 210 (1890).
3. The term "standing" in private antitrust actions differs from the meaning of "stand-
ing" in constitutional litigation. In antitrust law, standing is used to determine whether the
plaintiff is the proper party to maintain the action. A plaintiff must allege an injury in law as
well as an injury in fact. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters, 103 S. Ct. 897, 907 n.31. See Pollock, Standng to Sue, Remoteness of Injuly, and the
Passing-On Doctrine, 32 ANTrrRUST L.J. 5, 6-7 (1966). In constitutional law, standing requires
that the plaintiff allege an injury in fact. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-500 (1975).
4. See infa text accompanying notes 21-30.
5. See infra text accompanying notes 31-35.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 36-41.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 42-45.
8. 103 S. Ct. 897 (1983).
9. See infra text accompanying note 11.
10. The term "antitrust standing" as used in this comment refers only to pnate actions
under § 4. Actions brought by the government are beyond the scope of this paper.
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Particular reference is made to the positive and negative effects which this
newly articulated balancing test can have on a plaintiffs ability to achieve
standing in antitrust actions.
I. BACKGROUND OF ANTITRUST STANDING
The Clayton Act's private damages provision, section 4, is a broadly
worded remedial statute which provides, in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in
any district court in the United States . . .and shall recover three-
fold the damages by him sustained . ...
The Supreme Court has recognized that Congress imposed this multiple
measure of damages in order to: 1) provide injured parties with an incentive
to bring antitrust actions, 2) deter potential violators, 3) deprive violators of
the fruits of their illegality, and 4) adequately compensate victims.'
2
In addition to section 4's remedial purpose, courts have also used this
provision to determine whether a plaintiff has a right to maintain an anti-
trust action. In an effort to consistently evaluate a plaintiff's standing to sue
for treble damages, the district and circuit courts have previously used four
tests: direct injury, target area, zone of interests, and matrix of factors. The
courts, however, have had great difficulty in applying any of these tests con-
sistently to antitrust standing cases. In addition, until Associated General Con-
tractors, the Supreme Court had not taken the opportunity to assess the
merits of the various approaches set forth above.
1 3
Despite its reticence in evaluating the various standing doctrines, the
Supreme Court has denied standing under section 4 to a particular group of
plaintiffs on two previous occasions. 14 In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co. 15 the
Court held that a state may not recover damages on behalf of its citizens for
antitrust injuries sustained by its "general economy."' 6 The Court reasoned
that duplicative recovery could result if individual consumers and busi-
nesses, as well as a state on behalf of its general economy, were able to main-
tain actions under section 4.17 In the second case, llhinois Brick Co. v.
Ilhnozs,'8 the majority held that only "direct purchasers" in the chain of
manufacturing and distribution were injured parties who may maintain a
11. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
12. Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
13. Id at 476 n.12 (the Court noted that it had no occasion to "evaluate the relative utility
of any of [the] possibly conflicting approaches toward the problem of remote antitrust injury.")
For an overview of the different standing doctrines see generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, 2
ANTITRUST LAW §§ 333-42 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST § 247
(1977).
14. Two scholars have characterized the Supreme Court's approach in these two cases as a
categorization approach, which involves drawing analogies to various categories of plaintiffs
who in previous cases have been granted or denied standing. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note
1, at 820-30.
15. 405 U.S. 251 (1972).
16. Id at 265.
17. Id at 264.
18. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
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private antitrust action.' 9 The Supreme Court's decisions in both Hawaii
and Illinois Brick reflected strong judicial concern for minimizing the defend-
ant's exposure to potential multiple liability arising from a single antitrust
violation.
20
A. The Four Doctri'nes
1. Direct Injury
In 1910, the Third Circuit's decision in Loeb v. Eastman Kodak Co. 21 dis-
missed an antitrust suit by a shareholder of an injured corporation because
the plaintiff did not sustain any direct injury2 2 from the company's antitrust
violation.2 3 The court concluded that any injury Loeb might have received
as a shareholder was "indirect, remote, and consequential."
'24
The court's decision reflected judicial concern for the risk of duplicative
recovery. If shareholders, in addition to the company itself, were allowed to
recover treble damages from the antitrust violator, then duplicative damages
would be assessed against the defendant for the same unlawful act. The
court of appeals concluded that the statute's framers clearly did not envision
the violator being assessed sextupled damages for a single anti-competitive
act.
25
The direct injury test, which was the pervasive test used until the target
area approach was devised,2 6 opened the door to a flurry of court-seeking
methods to determine what constituted a direct or proximate injury stem-
ming from an anti-competitive activity. Tapping the resources of contract
and tort law, notions of privity 27 and intent 28 arose as a means of evaluation.
The requirement of privity of contract between the violator and victim was
dismissed, however, because it automatically excluded competitors from
maintaining private action suits. 29 Similarly, some courts have held that a
defendant's alleged intent to injure a plaintiff is insufficient to support anti-
19. Id. at 729.
20. In McCready the Supreme Court added another theme to its opinions in Hawaii and
Illinois Brzck: "the difficulty and consequences of apportioning damages may, in limited circum-
stances, be considered in determining who is entitled to prosecute an action brought under
section 4." McCready, 457 U.S. at 475 n. 11.
21. 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).
22. Although a federal judge had decided a similar case one year earlier in Ames v. Ameri-
can Tel. & Tel. Co., 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909), the term "direct injury" did not arise until
the decision in Loeb.
23. 183 F. at 709.
24. Id.
25. See id
26. See infta text accompanying notes 31-35.
27. See, e.g., Volasco Prods. Co. v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 308 F.2d 383, 395 (6th Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 907 (1963); Klein v. Lionel Corp., 237 F.2d 13, 15 (3d Cir. 1956).
28. See, e.g., Karseal Corp. v. Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 365 (9th Cir. 1955); Inter-
national Rys. of Cent. America v. United Brands Co., 358 F. Supp. 1363, 1372 (S.D.N.Y. 1973),
aj'don other grounds, 532 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1976).
29. E.g., South Carolina Council of Milk Producers v. Newton, 360 F.2d 414, 417 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 934 (1966); FLM Collision Parts v. Ford Motor Co., 406 F. Supp. 224,







In 1951, the Ninth Circuit developed the target area test.3 1 The target
area test requires that a plaintiff demonstrate that his antitrust injury is
within the economic area endangered by a breakdown of competitive condi-
tions.32 If the injury is found to be within the endangered area, then the
plaintiff has standing to maintain an antitrust action under section 4.33
Due to the broadness of the "endangered area" concept, the courts have
sought to define its parameters by applying the doctrine of foreseeability.
The foreseeability doctrine requires that the alleged injury is within the eco-
nomic area foreseeably harmed by an antitrust violation. 34 The foreseeabil-
ity approach, however, has been rejected by several courts because it allows a
party to sue without regard to their relationship to the defendant.
35
3. Zone of Interests Test
In 1975, the Sixth Circuit case of Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp. 36 intro-
duced the zone of interests analysis into the field of antitrust standing. In
Malamud, the court allowed a gasoline retailer to sue for treble damages for
alleged lost profits due to a gasoline supplier's failure to provide financial
assistance for the retailer's expansion plans.3 7 The court reasoned that the
availability of financing and the denial thereof by Sinclair arguably came
within a zone of interest-combination or conspiracies in restraint of trade
30. E.g., Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 189 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 923 (1971); Midway Enterprises, Inc. v. Petroleum Marketing Corp., 375 F. Supp.
1339, 1342 (D. Md. 1974). For a discussion of the problems of an intent requirement, see gener-
ally, Sherman, Antitrusting Standing: From Loeb to Malamud, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 374, 389-91
(1976).
31. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 919 (1952). The target area test has been adopted in other circuits as well. See, e.g.,
Commerce Tankers Corp. v. National Maritime Union of America, 553 F.2d 793 (2d Cir. 1977);
Donovan Construction Co. v. Florida Tel. Corp., 564 F.2d 1191 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435
U.S. 1007 (1978).
32. 193 F.2d at 54-55.
33. Compared to the direct injury rule, the target area approach shifts the emphasis from
the victim-violator relationship to the victim's relationship with the area of the economy alleg-
edly injured by the defendant. In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution M.D.L. No. 31, 481
F.2d 122, 127-28, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973).
34. The foreseeability approach in antitrust standing ensued from language in Karseal, 221
F.2d at 358, where the court concluded that the plaintiff "was not only hit, but was aimed at"
by the defendant. Id. at 365. The court in Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. Goldwyn, 328
F.2d 190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 880 (1964), stated that the language "was intended to
express the view that . . . plaintiff's affected operation was actually in the area which it could
reasonably be foreseen would be affected by the conspiracy." Id at 220. See also Hoopes v.
Union Oil Co., 374 F.2d 480, 485 (9th Cir. 1967).
35. In Calderone Enterprises Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972), the court rejected the foreseeability notion by
stating that, the "foreseeability test ... would permit anyone to sue, regardless of how distant
his interest or relationship . . . since it would be difficult to disprove the fact that remote eco-
nomic repercussions in the line of distribution result from almost every antitrust violation." Id.
at 1296 n.2.
36. 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975).
37. Id at 1151-52.
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protected by the antitrust laws. 38 The court, articulating the zone of inter-
ests test, stated that if a plaintiffs injury arguably comes within the zone of
interests protected by the antitrust laws, he could maintain a treble damage
action under section 4.39
The Sixth Circuit, in Malamud, criticized the direct injury and target
area methods as prematurely deciding the merits of the antitrust claims
"under the guise of assessing" a claimant's standing to sue.40 Adopting the
zone of interests approach from administrative law, the Sixth Circuit con-
cluded that this test was preferable because it did not demand as much from
the plaintiff at the pleading stage of the action.
4 1
4. Matrix of Factors Analysis
The final method used to determine legal causation allowing a plaintiff
standing under section 4 is the balancing test espoused in 1976 by the Third
Circuit in Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corp. 42 Reasoning that
all antitrust standing analyses inherently include a weighing of factors, the
Third Circuit adopted a case-by-case balancing approach to antitrust stand-
ing evaluations.4 3 The court concluded that a matrix of important factors
should be analyzed to determine whether the plaintiff "is one whose protec-
tion is the fundamental purpose of the antitrust laws."'44 The court listed the
following as the controlling factors: the nature of the industry from which
the alleged antitrust violation flows, the relationship between the plaintiff
and the alleged violator, and the effect of the violation upon the injured
party.
45
II. AssociA TED GENERAL CONTRACTORS
A. Facts
Against this background of a judicial search for a proper standing crite-
ria, the Associated General Contractors case was brought before the courts. The
case involved a class action suit initiated by two labor unions, the California
State Council of Carpenters, 46 and the Carpenters 46 Northern Counties
38. Id at 1152.
39. Id at 1152 (quoting Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970)).
40. I at 1150.
41. 521 F.2d at 1149.
42. 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 1976).
43. Id at 505-08. Other courts as well have followed a case-by-case approach which fo-
cused on the factual matrix and the policy considerations for and against standing in the partic-
ular case. See, e.g., Mid-West Paper Prod. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 581-87
(3d Cir. 1979); Bravman v. Bassett Furniture Indus., Inc., 552 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 823 (1977).
44. 543 F.2d at 506.
45. Id
46. The California State Council of Carpenters is the collective bargaining agent for
carpenters and their affiliated local unions with respect to master collective bargaining agree-
ments governing the California carpentry industry. California State Council of Carpenters v.
Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648 F.2d 527, 529 (9th Cir. 1980).
19831
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Conference Board.4 7 These two organizations (the Union) represented more
than 50,000 individuals employed in carpentry-related industries throughout
California.
48
The defendant was Associated General Contractors of California, Inc.
(Associated), a membership corporation comprised of more than 250 con-
struction contractors. 49 For more than twenty-five years, the Union and As-
sociated had entered into collective bargaining agreements governing the
terms and conditions of employment in the California construction
industry.
50
The complaint alleged a continuing conspiracy by Associated and its
members to weaken and destroy the collective bargaining agreements be-
tween the Union and those who employ the Union. 5 1 Among the acts alleg-
edly committed in furtherance of the conspiracy were Associated's coercion
of landowners to hire non-Union subcontractors. 52 The Union pleaded, in-
ter alia, that this alleged conspiracy violated section 1 of the Sherman Act
5 3
by adversely affecting the trade of certain unionized firms.5 4 The Union
claimed to have suffered twenty-five million dollars in damages, and sought
a trebling of those damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety for failing to
state a claim for relief.5 5 For the dismissal of the federal antitrust claim, the
court reasoned that while collective bargaining agreements may give rise to
antitrust violations, normal labor disputes between a union and an employer
do not state a cause of action under section 4.56
47. The Carpenters 46 County Conference Board is the collective bargaining agent for
carpenters employed in the drywall industry. Id
48. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 103
S. Ct. 897, 900 (1983).
49. d
50. Id
51. Paragraph 23 of the complaint alleged:
Since on or about April 1, 1974, and continuing to date, defendants and each of them
have entered into a plan, scheme, agreement and conspiracy, knowingly, willfully and
maliciously, whose purpose and ends are to abrogate, destroy, undermine and weaken
the collective bargaining relationship between plaintiffs and each of them and defend-
ants and each of them, and between plaintiffs and other parties to the above described
collective bargaining agreements; included within the other parties are the California
Drywall Contractors Association and all "memorandum contractors" to the above de-
scribed master collective bargaining agreements.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App. E- 16.
52. Paragraph 24(4) alleged that the defendants knowingly:
advocated, encouraged, induced, coerced, aided and encouraged owners of land and
other letters of construction contracts to hire contractors and subcontractors who are
not signatories to collective bargaining agreements with plaintiffs and each of them.
Id at 18. (emphasis added).
53. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
54. The Union further claimed that, through this conspiracy, Associated breached its col-
lective bargaining agreements with the Union, violated California's antitrust statute, and com-
mitted the torts of intentional interference with contractual relations and intentional
interference with business relationships. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 900 n. 1.
55. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 404
F. Supp. 1067 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
56. Id. at 1069. The court observed that the allegations "appear typical of disputes a
union might have with an employer," which in the normal course are resolved by grievance and
arbitration or by the National Labor Relations Board.
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The Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of the Union's federal antitrust
claim.5 7 The court, with one member dissenting, used the target area theory
and concluded that the Union was within the area of the economy endan-
gered by a breakdown of competitive conditions. 58 The Ninth Circuit court
reasoned that the Union's injury was not only a foreseeable consequence of
Associated's alleged boycott, but also an intended result. 59 Rejecting the
lower court's holding that a labor dispute exemption6° be applied to this
antitrust action, 6 1 the court of appeals concluded that the Union had stand-
ing to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.6 2 Disagree-
ing with the Ninth Circuit's decision, Associated perfected an appeal to the
United States Supreme Court.
B. The Majority Holding
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth
Circuit in an eight to one decision.6 3 The broad issue the Court addressed
was whether the antitrust claim sufficiently alleged that the Union was in-
jured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws. 64 The Court held that the
Union's complaint was insufficient as a matter of law and denied the Union
standing to sue for treble damages under section 4 of the Clayton Act.
65
The Court began its antitrust standing analysis by reasoning that sec-
tion 4, although broadly worded, should be narrowly construed. Alterna-
tively stated, every injury incurred "by reason of" an antitrust violation
should not be actionable. 66 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, pro-
ceeded by noting the vain attempts federal judges have made to provide a
definitive rule which would determine whether a plaintiff is a proper party
to bring an antitrust action. 67 Stating that courts should analyze antitrust
standing issues through a case-by-case method, the majority settled on a bal-
ancing of specific factors.68
Although acknowledging the importance of Associated's alleged intent
to cause harm to the Union, the majority concluded that the improper mo-
57. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648
F.2d 527 (9th Cir. 1980). The court of appeals affirmed the dismissal of all other claims. Id at
529.
58. Id. at 538.
59. Id
60. See infia text accompanying notes 113-19.
61. Id. at 536.
62. The court stated that its holding was consistent with several recent decisions in which
employee groups had been allowed to maintain private antitrust actions on the ground that
they were within the target area of the defendant's antitrust activities. Id at 539. See, e.g.,
Tugboat, Inc. v. Mobile Towing Co., 534 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (5th Cir. 1976); International
Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators v. United Contractors Ass'n, 483 F.2d 384, 397-98 (3d Cir.
1973), modified, 494 F.2d 1353 (3d Cir. 1974); Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 389 F.
Supp. 867, 884-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
63. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 897.
64. Id. at 899.
65. Id at 913.
66. Id at 904-08.
67. Id at 907-08.
68. Id. The Court stated that "courts should analyze each situation in light of the factors
set forth in the text." Id at 908 n.33.
1983]
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tive of the plaintiff does not necessarily serve as the decisive factor for evalu-
ating a plaintiffs standing under section 4.69 Instead, the decision focused
on the nature of the Union's injury. The court sought to determine whether
the plaintiff's antitrust injury fell within the purview of congressional con-
cern. 70 Justice Stevens, citing Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,7t coined this
determination as the Brunswick test.
72
The Brunswick test involves a two-step analysis. The first step is to deter-
mine whether the injured party is a consumer or a competitor in the market
in which trade was allegedly restrained. 73 The test's second step asks
whether the injury was of a "type" Congress meant to redress by the anti-
trust laws.7 4 If the plaintiff fails to satisfy either of the Brunswick require-
ments, its private antitrust claim will most likely be dismissed due to the
plaintiff's lack of standing to sue.
75
In Associated General Contractors, the Court held: 1) that the Union was
neither a consumer nor a competitor in the restrained market; 76 and 2) that
due to both the history of labor unions as unique organizations governed by
a separate body of labor law, and the long labor-related relationship be-
tween Union and Associated, the Union's injury was not of a type Congress
meant to redress. 77 Accordingly, the plaintiff failed both parts of the Bruns-
wick test.
The Court continued its standing analysis by addressing the directness
of the Union's injury. Stating that the individual unionized subcontractors
(the Union's members) would be the direct victims of the alleged coercion,
and not the Union itself, the majority concluded that the Union's injury was
only an indirect result of the alleged violation. An indirect victim, the Court
stated, is not guaranteed a right to maintain an action under section 4.78
An additional factor the Court applied was whether the Union's alleged
injury was tenuous and speculative. Citing Hawaiiv. Standard Oil,79 the ma-
jority stated that if the alleged harm is remote and obviously speculative,
then it may be appropriate to place the claim beyond the reach of section
69. Id at 908.
70. Id
71. 457 U.S. 465, 483-84 (1982).
72. The Brunswick test arose from the 1977 Supreme Court decision in Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). In Brunswick, operators of bowling centers
brought an action against a manufacturer of bowling equipment alleging that the manufac-
turer's acquisition of bowling centers violated antitrust laws. The Court held that the plaintiffs'
loss of income, which would have accrued had the failing centers acquired by the defendant
gone bankrupt, was not the type of injury the Clayton Act was intended to protect. Id at 487.
73. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 909.
74. Id at 910.
75. Although the Court in Associated Generat Contractors set forth a balancing test, the nu-
ances of the majority opinion indicate that because the nature of the plaintiff's injury was not
one which the antitrust laws intended to protect, the plaintiff should be denied standing regard-
less of the additional factors to be weighed. See id at 908-09.
76. Id. at 909.
77. Id at 909.10. The Court stated that a Union "will frequently not be part of the class
the Sherman Act was designed to protect, especially in disputes with employers. Id. at
910.
78. Id. at 910-11.
79 405 U.S. at 262-63 n.14.
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4.80 Largely due to the Union's lack of alleging specific injury in its com-




Making a judicial economy argument, Justice Stevens also noted the
Court's policy to deny standing to a plaintiff whose antitrust claim would
likely overburden the courts when they have to ascertain damages.82 Find-
ing that the district court would be exposed to numerous problems of identi-
fying and apportioning the damages between the Union and its members
individually, the Court concluded that the Union's claim would overburden
the judicial system. 83 Adding this factor to its analysis, the majority held
that the factors against allowing the Union standing outweighed those fac-
tors in favor of a suit.
84
C. The Dissent
Justice Marshall's lone dissent argued that Congress' use of the words
"anyperson who [has been] injured. . . by reason of anything forbidden in the
antitrust laws" in section 4 manifests a legislative intent to broadly enforce
alleged antitrust violations. 85 Noting the broad language of section 4 cou-
pled with the Supreme Court's prior expansive readings of the statute,8
6 Jus-
tice Marshall reasoned that the Union's antitrust injury did fit comfortably
within the framework for standing.
8 7
Justice Marshall rejected the majority's use of the direct-indirect injury
factor. 88 Analogizing antitrust claims to tort actions, Justice Marshall stated
that an inquiry into proximate cause has traditionally been rejected when
the defendant intends to inflict injury upon the plaintiff. He reasoned that
because the Union was the intended victim of Associated's coercive efforts to
induce construction contractors to refrain from using unionized carpeniers,
the remoteness of the Union's injury was irrelevant for standing purposes.8 9
Agreeing with the majority that the exact reduction in dues may be a
difficult fact-finding procedure, Justice Marshall stated that the plaintiff
need only provide a reasonable estimate of the harm.9° He emphasized the
80. 103 S. Ct. at 911.
81. Id The Court also noted that the indirect nature of the Union's claim influenced its
determination that the claim was highly speculative. Id.
82. See, e.g., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737-38, 745 (1977) (massive and
complex damages litigation not only burdens the courts, but also undermines the effectiveness of
treble damage suits); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 493
(1968) (denying defendants a defense that the plaintiff passed on their injury, the Court noted
that any attempt to ascertain damages with precision would involve massive evidence and com-
plicated theories).
83. 103 S. Ct. at 911-12.
84. Id at 913.
85. Id. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
86. See, e.g., Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (provision is broad enough to
allow standing to a consumer who pays a higher price as a result of an antitrust violation);
Pfizer Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978) (statutory phrase "any person" is broad enough to
include a foreign sovereign).
87. 103 S. Ct. at 913 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
88. Id at 914.
89. Id at 914-15.
90. Id. at 916.
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Court's policy of placing the burden of any uncertainty of damages upon the
wrongdoer, and not upon the victim.9 1
Justice Marshall also stressed that the risk of duplicative recovery, a
critical element in prior Supreme Court cases denying a plaintiff standing,
was not a factor in the Union's claim. 9 2 The loss of union dues, the dissent
pointed out, was an injury distinct from any possible claim that other in-
jured parties may bring. 93 Recognizing the absence of risk of duplicative
recovery, Justice Marshall concluded that the Union's action should not be
dismissed solely on the basis of the pleadings.
94
III. ANALYSIS
A. The Balancing Test-An Appropriate Standing Doctrine
Presented with different approaches to guide antitrust standing deter-
minations, the majority in Associated General Contractors wisely decided on a
compromise by creating its own version of a balancing test. Recognizing the
difficulties of formulating a precise test to apply to all standing evaluations,
the Court correctly averted adopting either the target area, direct injury,
zone of interests, or matrix of factors test for its analysis.95 Commentators
have also expressed the apparent impossibility of applying any of these vari-
ous tests and obtaining consistent results.
96
The Supreme Court's decision to weigh certain factors in private anti-
trust standing determinations will provide a long-lasting framework for fu-
ture standing cases. This is due to the flexible nature of balancing tests in
general. 97 The test proportions the weight of relevant policies as each situa-
tion warrants. This flexibility is especially desired in antitrust litigation be-
cause of its inherent complexity and the constantly changing economic
environment surrounding the antitrust laws.98
91. Id. (quoting Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946)).
92. 103 S. Ct. at 915-16.
93. Justice Marshall reasoned that the loss of individual unionized subcontractor's reve-
nues as a result of the alleged boycott would also decrease the amount of dues paid to the Union
because part of the annual payment of dues is based on a percentage of work. Id at 915.
94. Id. at 916.
95. The balancing test espoused in Associated General Contractors is quite similar, however, to
the matrix of factors approach used in Cromar. In Associated General Contractors, the Court relied
on a list of six factors to guide their analysis: intent of the violator, nature of the antitrust
injury, directness of the injury, speculativeness of the claim, difficulty of apportioning damages,
and the risk of duplicative recovery. 103 S. Ct. at 913. In comparison, the Third Circuit in
Cromar focused on a set of three factors: the nature of the industry from which the alleged
antitrust violation flows, the relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged violator, and the
effect of the violation upon the injured party. 543 F.2d at 506.
96. See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 835, 843; Handler, The Shiflfrom Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antirust Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 27-31 (1971); Sherman, supra note
30, at 407 (1976) ("it is simply not possible to fashion an across-the-board and easily applied
standing rule which can serve as a tool of decision for every case").
97. The balancing test, which is used frequently in modern first amendment jurisprudence,
has been noted as "an extremely flexible case-by-case approach." Gunther, In Search ofJudcial
Quality ofa Changing Court.- The Case of justice Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1027 (1972); See also
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 580-84 (1978).
98. It is widely recognized that each anti-competitive activity causes ripples of injury
through an entire economy. E.g., Billy Baxter, 431 F.2d at 187. Accordingly, any attempt to
divide damages in proportion to the amount of antitrust injury sustained by each consumer is a
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A countervailing argument can be made, however, to the point that the
balancing test may not provide rigid guidance to both the lower courts and
the plaintiffs themselves. Exactly how the courts will apply the six factors of
the balancing test to future antitrust standing cases remains to be seen. At
least now, the antitrust plaintiff knows which standing test and by what cri-
teria their standing status will be evaluated.
B. The Choice of Factors
Two of the six factors the Supreme Court used in its balancing test are
important factors for antitrust standing determinations, namely, the risk of
duplicative recovery and the intent of the violator. The majority, however,
used three other factors which appear to be less useful when evaluating anti-
trust standing cases: the difficulty of apportioning damages, the speculative
nature of the claim, and the nature of the injury.
First, the Supreme Court's concern for the risk of multiple recovery is a
policy well-founded in precedent. The policy was announced as early as
191099 and reinforced in 1982 by the Court in Blue Shield of Virginia v. Mc-
Cready. °° In addition to case law support, traditional notions of equity de-
mand that a defendant should not be penalized numerous times for the same
injury.
Second, an alleged violator's intention to cause injury to a particular
class of persons is also a relevant factor to consider in determining a plain-
tiff's standing to sue. It is well-settled that a defendant's specific intent may
be important to the question whether a violation of antitrust law has been
alleged.' 0 ' Moreover, because intent is a requirement for certain antitrust
violations, it is an important factor to consider in standing analyses. 1
02
The Supreme Court used three other factors in their balancing test
which are troublesome. First, although it is important to recognize the need
complex procedure. See Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 731-32. ("Permitting the use of pass-on theo-
ries under section 4 essentially would transform treble-damages actions into massive efforts to
apportion the recovery .. ") Formulating a consistent method to apportion antitrust dam-
ages is difficult not only because of the inherent complexity of the subject matter, but also
because of the continued growth and volatility in the economic environment.
Since their enactment in 1890, the antitrust laws have developed in economies which are
constantly changing. One sector which has served as a catalyst for this change is technology.
The amount of technological advancement which has been made within the last century is
outstanding. Moreover, the beginning of the computer era and its resultant increase in effi-
ciency and productivity guarantees a continuously changing economic environment. Therefore,
adopting a test such as the balancing test, which can more easily adapt to the economic realities
surrounding the antitrust laws, appears to be a prudent approach.
99. The sixth factor, directness of the injury, can have both positive and negative effects on
future antitrust standing determinations. A conclusion of whether this factor should be in-
cluded in a standing analysis is not reached by the author. Accordingly, a discussion of this
sixth factor is not included in this analysis.
100. 457 U.S. 465, 475 (1982) (consumer of psychological services was allowed to maintain
an action under section 4 against a health insurer because the defendant engaged in an unlaw-
ful conspiracy and there existed "not the slightest possibility of a duplicative" recovery).
101. See United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 522 (1948).
102. Contracts and conspiracies in restraint of trade, such as group boycotts, are often inten-
tionally inflicted upon the victims. An alleged intent to harm a party is well-exemplified in the
subject case Associated General Contractors where Associated's alleged anti-competitive activities
were directed solely at harming the Union's trade.
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to decrease administrative burdens on the courts, dismissing a plaintiff's ac-
tion before trial because of the potential difficulties of damage apportion-
ment seems to be an unfair procedure to impose on a plaintiff.'0 3 Moreover,
Congress intended section 4 to rigorously promote the private enforcement
of antitrust claims, not to impose restraints. 10 4 The burden of formulating
mathematical equations to approximate the amount of antitrust injury sus-
tained by the victim should rest on the legislature and not the plaintiff.
10 5
Second, the Supreme Court's use of the tenuous nature of the plaintiff's
claim as a factor for standing also warrants criticism. Although the Supreme
Court has previously used the "speculative, abstract, or impractical" nature
of a claim as a basis for denying standing, 0 6 a determination of this kind
needs more information than the pleadings provide. As Justice Marshall
correctly pointed out in his dissent, if facts exist "to support an inference of
causation," the substance of a claim should be decided by trial.
10 7
The final factor employed by the Court which appears unsatisfactory is
the nature of the plaintiffs injury. Specifically, the Court asks whether the
alleged injury falls within the type the antitrust laws sought to protect and
redress.' 0 8 To maintain an action, a plaintiff should only have to sufficiently
allege the necessary requirements to state a claim for relief, the plaintiff
should not have toprove the merits of his claim in the pleadings.10 9 A plain-
tiff should be entitled to present at trial, inter alia, expert testimony explain-
ing the economic ramifications of the defendant's alleged anti-competitive
act. Without expert testimony and other fact-finding techniques, the courts
103. See Malamud, 591 F.2d at 1149.
104. The initial House debates reveal that private damage actions were conceived primarily
as "open[ing] the door of justice to every man, whenever he may be injured by those who violate
the antitrust laws." 51 CONG. REC. 9073 (1914) (remarks of Rep. Webb); See, e.g., Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968).
105. An example of the misuse of the damage apportionment factor was seen here in Associ-
ated General Contractors. The Court weighed this factor against the Union because the District
Court would "face problems" of identifying damages if the Union was allowed to maintain the
action. Judges and juries, however, regularly "face problems" of awarding damages. Therefore,
except where serious difficulties of damage apportionment are present, see lhnois Brick, 431 U.S.
at 737, and Hanover Shoe, 392 U.S. at 493, it would appear that an antitrust claim should not be
dismissed at the pleading stage, even partly because the courts will "face problems" of damage
assessment.
106. McCready, 457 U.S. at 475, n.11.
107. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 916 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Perkins
v. Standard Oil Co., 395 U.S. 642, 648 (1969)). See Berger & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 854-55:
To deny standing on grounds of speculative injury is to prejudge the merits of the
plaintiff's claim for damages, for speculativeness of injury implies inability to prove
that injury exists. But issues of adequacy of proof are ordinarily handled through
motions for summary judgment or for directed verdict. An antitrust plaintiff should
not be denied an opportunity to present all its evidence on causation and extent of
injury before the court rules on whether its allegations are sufficient as a matter of law;
indeed, such a denial is contrary to accepted notions of civil procedure.
Id.
108. This analysis is coined the Brunswick test. See supra notes 70-77 and accompanying text.
109. For a discussion of the problems created by incorporating substantive antitrust law in
standing determinations, see Berger & Bernstein, supra note 1, at 835-40. See Malamud, 521 F.2d
at 1149-50; But see Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) ("Although standing in no way
depends on the merits of the plaintiff's contention that particular conduct is illegal, it often
turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.").
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are deprived of knowledge which could aid in their evaluation of whether
the alleged injury is one the antitrust laws were meant to protect.
C. Creating a Double Standard
In Associated General Contractors, the Court applied its standing determi-
nation factors to the Union's claim that Associated conspired to weaken and
destroy the Union. The factor which the Court apparently weighed most
heavily in its decision was the nature of the alleged injury.' 1° The majority
concluded that the Union's injury was not of a type which the antitrust laws
intended to redress. I I This conclusion, however, is inconsistent with prior
case law involving the clash between labor unions and the antitrust laws.'
12
1. Labor and the Antitrust Laws
Posed with a dilemma that labor unions, in theory and practice, were
conspiracies in restraint of trade, Congress had to harmonize labor policies
with policies favoring free competition."l 3  Reaching a pro-labor solution,
Congress explicitly exempted the collective bargaining activities of labor or-
ganizations from the antitrust laws by enacting two provisions of the Clay-
ton Act: section 6114 and section 20.115 Section 6 provides that labor unions
are not unlawful, and that neither the unions nor their members may be
considered illegal combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade. Section
20 prohibits courts from issuing injunctions against certain specified activi-
ties arising from labor disputes. Enacting these pro-labor statutory clauses,
Congress has clearly expressed its intention to promote labor organizations
within the framework of the antitrust laws.
Although these clauses exempt labor from specified anti-competitive vi-
olations, the Supreme Court has held that certain labor union activities are
punishable under the antitrust laws.1 16 One method used to determine
110. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 908.
111. Id at 913.
112. An in-depth discussion of the relationship between labor organizations and the anti-
trust laws is beyond the scope of this comment. The Court's decision to deny the Union stand-
ing, however, is so clearly adverse to previous Supreme Court decisions which allow, under
similar circumstances, an employer to maintain an antitrust action against a union, that a brief
discussion of the Associated General Contractors anti-labor decision is warranted. For additional
discussions on the interplay between union activities and the antitrust laws, see generally, P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, I ANTrrRUST LAw § 229 (1978); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 13, at § 237
(1977); Casey & Cazzillio, Labor-Antitrust. The Problems of Connell and A Remedy that Follows Natu-
rally, 1980 DUKE L.J. 235; Handler & Zifchak, Collective Bargaining and the Antitrust Laws: The
Emasculation of the Labor Exemption, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 459 (1981); Leslie, Principles of Labor
Antitrust, 66 VA. L. REV. 1183 (1980); Scheinholtz & Kettering, Exemption Under the Antitrust Laws
forjoint Employer Activity, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 347 (1983).
113. See Cox, Labor and the Antitnist Laws-A Prelimiaiy Analyst, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 252, 254
(1955) ("The purpose and effect of every labor organization is to eliminate competition in the
labor market."); Meltzer, Labor Unions, Collective Bargaining and The Antitrust Laws, 32 U. CHI. L.
REV. 659 (1965); Comment, Antitrust Law in Colorado. Back on Track, 60 DEN. L.J. 645, 652
(1983).
114. 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 20 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
116. See, e.g., Connell Constr. Co. v. Plumber & Steamfitters Local Union No. 100, 421 U.S.
616, 621-22, 625-36 (1975); United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662-69 (1965);
Allen Bradley Co. v. Local 3, IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 806-11 (1945).
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whether the labor activity is exempt from the antitrust laws has been to
draw a line between those anti-competitive acts which result from a typical
labor dispute" 7 and those which occur by reason of a concerted action or
agreement outside the normal bargaining arena." 8 If an antitrust injury
emerges from a typical "wage, hour or conditions" labor dispute between a
union and non-union party, the claim is exempt from the antitrust laws. 19
2. A Weak Analysis
In Associated General Contractors the Court should have addressed the dis-
tinction between the two types of circumstances which surround an anticom-
petitive act involving union and non-union parties. If the majority had
properly analyzed the Union's claim, 120 the Court would have recognized
that the Union's alleged injury was not a result of a typical labor dispute. A
labor-related conspiracy, especially one which involves coercive activities,1 2 1
restraining the trade of a particular business is, without doubt, a concerted
action not exempt from the antitrust laws. 122 Therefore, because 1) the
Union alleged that the defendants conspired to restrain the Union's trade, 123
2) for purposes of standing, all facts alleged are assumed to be provable,' 2 4
and 3) that a concerted anti-competitive act by a labor employer is not
within the antitrust exemption for labor activities, it appears that the Union
did sufficiently allege an injury which falls within the protection of the anti-
trust laws.
CONCLUSION
Since 1910,125 the framework used for antitrust standing decisions has
branched off in many directions. Until Associated General Contractors, there
were four different tests 126 applied to section 4 standing cases by the district
and circuit courts. Recognizing that these courts were interpreting the same
federal statute, it is fair to say that the field of antitrust standing was in a
117. P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 112, at 189 (1978) ("The antitrust laws apply as
usual to agreements among employers concerning wages and working conditions unless inti-
mately related to genuine collective bargaining with a union embracing the workers of the
agreeing employers.") (emphasis added); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 13, at 727-28 (1977) ("There
are subjects, such as wages, hours and working conditions, which are mandatory subjects of
collective bargaining. Where a union and employers in a bargaining relationship agree on
these, no antitrust violation occurs. .... )
118. See, e.g., Connell, 421 U.S. at 622 (citing UnitedMfne Workers, 381 U.S. at 662).
119. See supra note 117.
120. The Supreme Court failed in itn analysis to cite any precedent which supported its
conclusion that a long labor-related relationship exempted a non-union party from an antitrust
violation directed at a labor union. See Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 910.
121. The Union in Associated General Contractors alleged that it suffered injuries as a result of
the defendants' coercion of landowners and other third parties. See supra note 52.
122. California State Council of Carpenters v. Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc., 648
F.2d 527, 532-36 (the Union's claim did not fall within either the statutory or non-statutory
antitrust exemptions afforded to certain labor activities).
123. See supra note 57.
124. Associated General Contractors, 103 S. Ct. at 902 "As the case comes to us, we must assume
that the Union can prove the facts alleged in its amended complaint."
125. Loeb v. Eastman Kodak, Co., 183 F. 704 (3d Cir. 1910).




state of disarray. The Supreme Court in Associated General Contractors, how-
ever, has begun to shape a definitive antitrust standing policy.
Confronted with four standing doctrines currently in use by the circuit
courts-direct injury, target area, zone of interests, and matrix of factors-
the Court correctly selected a workable approach to antitrust standing deter-
minations by creating their own version of the balancing test. The balanc-
ing method is an extremely flexible test. 127 This flexibility is particularly
desirable in antitrust litigation because of the subject matter's inherent com-
plexity. The Court's selection of a balancing test, therefore, should provide a
cogent framework for antitrust standing analysis.
The Court's balancing test hinged on six different factors. Two of the
factors-the possibility of duplicative recovery and intent-are important
factors to evaluate to determine whether the plaintiff is a proper party to
maintain an action under section 4. Both of these factors have been well-
established in case law as important considerations in weighing a plaintiff's
antitrust standing status. 128
Unfortunately, however, three of the factors which the majority articu-
lated as controlling in the standing analysis appear to be unsatisfactory, and
thus, are subject to criticism. Two of these three factors-the nature of the
injury and the speculative character of the claim-delve into the merits of an
antitrust claim. It is unwise to place obstacles of substantive law in front of a
plaintiff during the pleading stage because of the possibility that these obsta-
cles will deter potential plaintiffs from bringing actions against antitrust vio-
lations. Any reduction in the private enforcement mechanism of American
antitrust law is an injury to our free enterprise system.
The Court's use of the difficulty of damage apportionment is also an
unsatisfactory factor for determining standing. In antitrust cases, the federal
courts inevitably face problems of apportioning the amount of antitrust in-
jury sustained by the victim because of the economic complexities involved
in anti-competitive acts. A plaintiff should not be denied standing merely
because the court envisions difficulty in awarding damages. '
2 9
The Court's decision in Associated General Contractors to deny the Union
standing was not only adverse to Congress's explicit attempts to harmonize
labor policies with antitrust policy, but also inconsistent with precedent rec-
ognizing that certain labor-related antitrust violations are not exempt from
the antitrust laws. The majority wrongly concluded that the labor union's
injury was not within the type of injury the antitrust laws sought to protect.
The alleged injury was a conscious, anti-competitive act by the defendant.
Ample precedent can be cited supporting the proposition that, although nor-
mal labor disputes involving wage, hour and working conditions do not war-
rant an antitrust action, concerted anti-competitive acts outside these typical
labor dispute areas are violative of the antitrust laws. Reconciling case law
with the alleged facts of the claim, the finding in Associated General Contractors
127. See supra note 97.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 99-102.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 103-09.
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that the Union's alleged injury was not protected by the antitrust laws, was
clearly unsupported.
By dismissing the Union's antitrust claim before the Union had its day
in court, the Supreme Court has possibly reduced the capacity of labor orga-
nizations to maintain treble damage actions against employers who violate
the antitrust laws. Whether the Associated General Contractors decision will un-
fold a trend by the Court to dilute pro-labor policies remains to be seen. In
the meantime, although Associated General Contractors sets forth a much
needed skeleton framework for antitrust standing evaluations, the decision to
deny a labor union standing to maintain a antitrust suit under section 4 of
the Clayton Act will inevitably have some damaging effects on labor organi-
zations when they next collide with the antitrust laws.
C/ifrd Chanler
